Archive for January, 2012
I reproduce from Economistmeg.com an article written by Megan Greene on what follows in the story of the Greek debt crisis.
German proposal for Greece’s compliance: accelerating eurozone exit
JANUARY 28, 2012
At the top of my list of to do’s for the past few weeks has been to update the post on Greek PSI that I wrote just before Christmas to include some more recent developments, such as the prospect of ECB participation. Last night, Peter Spiegel from the Financial Times (@SpiegelPeter) published the German government’s proposalfor Greece’s “improvement of compliance” with the terms of the bailout, and all of a sudden Greek PSI positively pales in comparison. According to Germany’s proposal, whatever the result of the PSI deal, Greece will need to “legally commit itself to giving absolute priority to future debt service” and “accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level”. If the Greek government is not willing to do this, the troika would presumably turn off the taps of bailout money and Greece would default. With no access to market or official financing, Greece would be forced to exit the eurozone.
What is public sector corruption?
The Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 highlights corruption in the public sector. But what exactly does this mean? Transparency International’s press intern, Rosie Slater, explains.
Drawing on Transparency International’s Plain Language Guide, this post defines and de-mystifies some of the words and phrases most often associated with this kind of corruption. So if you’re confused by anything that you’ve seen on our website or in our faqs, read on.
First of all, let’s look at corruption itself. We use this word all the time, but what do we actually mean by it? Transparency International defines corruption broadly as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This can happen anywhere, and can be classified as grand or petty, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.
Αναδημοσιεύω από το madata.gr
Ο Σύλλογος ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΦΟΡΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΙ, κατά το διάστημα του Δεκεμβρίου 2011 και του Ιανουαρίου 2012, πραγματοποίησε μιν ειδική μελέτη, η οποία βασίστηκε στην ανάλυση της νομοθεσίας κάθε χώρας, αλλά και στις αξιολογήσεις κάθε χώρας από τα όργανα του Συμβουλίου της Ευρώπης, και εξετάζει τα συστήματα και τις πρακτικές χρηματοδότησης των πολιτικών κομμάτων στις χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.
Τη μελέτη αυτή, την εξέδωσε σήμερα σε μορφή βιβλίου, με τίτλο:
ΤΟ ΚΟΣΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ – Μέρος 1ο: Η Χρηματοδότηση των Πολιτικών Κομμάτων.
Ιστορικός δεν είμαι. Απλά λατρεύω την μοντέρνα ιστορία. Συχνά πυκνά ανατρέχω σε κεφάλαια βιβλίων που έχω διαβάσει παλιότερα για να διατηρώ τη μνήμη μου και την ιστορική μου επιχειρηματολογία σε ικανοποιητικά επίπεδα. Έτσι λοιπόν έκανα και σήμερα…
μ’ένα από τα αγαπημένα μου βιβλία (ιστορίας και μη) του Βασίλη Ραφαηλίδη, “Η κωμικοτραγική ιστορία του Νεοελληνικού Κράτους” εκδ. Εικοστού Πρώτου.(1)
Πέφτω πάνω στα κεφάλαια που αφιερώνονται στον Ελληνικό εμφύλιο και τα γεγονότα που τον περιβάλουν. Χαρακτηριστικά διαβάζω:
Given the opportunity derived from the article posted by Mr. Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece to Financial Times this evening, i had the wish to reply.
My prediction is that the near future will reveal that the views expressed by the governor of the Bank of Greece are unrealistic. Primarily for two simple reasons that are not at all discussed by Mr. Provopoulos.
First, the Government that is implementing the reforms, for a respectable proportion of the Greek public, is perceived as non-legitimate, non-democratically elected and thus non-socially acceptable. Although they have an enormous parliamentarian majority, the ability to make an effective policy change and reform the economy primarily depends upon the perception of how legitimacy the government is. In the Greek current case perhaps the government lacks of that dynamic. Hence, any policy change that is proposed and enacted will fall into the umbrella of the authoritarian decision-making hence will gradually increase the existing tension which will in the end lead to social unrest (at a level that the past will seem idealistic and peaceful compared to what will occur)
Second reason why the government’s attempt to reform and restructure the economy is condemned to a massive failure concerns the issue of the disbelief and uncertainty derived from both domestic entities and foreign institutions and officials on whether the Greek economy can be viable by remaining in the Eurozone. Foreign agents ranging from public officials in the EU, IMF and ECB tend to offer opinions and statements that contradict, thus leading to an increase of the economic uncertainty. That disbelief of the success of the Austerity programme that is currently applied together with alternative scenarios that indicate Greece will not remain in the euro for very long destroy any positive attempt (if such exists) towards the increase of investments and expansion of the economic participation of the private sector. Assuming that today a private agent in Greece or abroad is interested in investing in a project and possesses the required capital to do so, the climate of uncertainty for the currency drives her to a delay and continuous postponement of the investing process. This delay is extremely rational given the enormous devaluation that will occur to a hypothesized new currency. An investor who decides to invest today in that unstable Greek environment is willing to take massive risks due to the immediate losses that will incur from a change in the currency and the devaluation that will follow as a consequence. Thus the potential investor chooses rationally to delay until the environment settles (and there is a political and economic guarantee what the currency will be in the medium-run).
Due to these two reasons my projection and economic forecast differs completely from that of the Governor of the Bank of Greece. I tend to believe that the push for reform and economic restructure will continue to expand while the response on behalf of the society and the private agents will continue to be defensive and negative. As the indicators will be on deficit from the expected ones further pushing for reforms will be required, by a perceived as non-legitimate government which will lead gradually to the perception of an aggressive strategy by the government and the aggression at some point will destroy the remains of the social cohesion within the Greek public with severe and perhaps threatening consequences. The existing economic strategy is condemned to failure due to the public opposition.
Stable Link for the Original Article by Mr. Provopoulos: http://clippings.ft.com/listnavigator/mwgs/1781471